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Are quantum ‘irreality’ and ‘nonlocality’
ineluctable?
A. F. Kracklauer
Bauhaus Universita¨t; Weimar, Germany
The early history of the development of Quantum Mechanics is surveyed to discern the arguments leading to the
introduction of the notions of ‘irreal’ wave functions and ‘nonlocal’ correlations. It is argued that the assumption
that Quantum Mechanics is ‘complete’, i.e., not just a variant of Statistical Mechanics, is the feature compelling
the introduction of these otherwise problematic properties. Additionally, a consequence of the error first found
by JAYNES in proofs of BELL’s “theorem”, is illustrated. Finally, speculation on the practical consequences of
recognising that “entanglement” is a feature of all hyperbolic differential equations is proposed.
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I. HISTORY
Twentieth century physicists faced extraordinary chal-
lenges in terms of the scale of the phenomena to be explained.
The extremely small sizes of the objects covered by Quantum
Mechanics (QM) and the very large scale of events covered by
Relativity, posed situations that were unimaginable within the
then customary understanding and concepts of science. This
fostered, out of desperation, license to introduce theretofore
unacceptably exotic hypotheses, (e.g., quantisation, frame in-
dependent light velocity) for which there was only indirect
laboratory evidence. At the same time, at least one desiderium
was assumed, largely without deep reflection, namely, that the
new theories under development were fundamental and com-
plete (that is, that at their level they are theories of individ-
ual entities, not theories quantifying statistics of ensembles of
such entities).
Herein, I shall argue that the last mentioned assumption,
completeness, is the key underlying cause that the exotic (and
arguably antirational) notions: irreality and nonlocality, have
been ensconced in QM. The reasoning that led to this situa-
tion, was not concerned in the first instance with the philo-
sophically problematic nature of these features, indeed the
terms themselves, as well as their accepted technical deno-
tation, appeared in the literature up to years later than the in-
troduction of the mathematical structure to which they refer.
For the sake of expository efficiency, herein a reconstructed
line of reasoning will be described that, I believe, is a compos-
ite of what happened, but not in the mind of any one person.
The actual development, to the extent that the historically true
story can be discerned at all in retrospect, was focused on find-
ing the mathematical structure that mimicked those aspects of
the studied phenomena accessible to experiment, which were
nearly always imagined to be just a portion of what happens
‘down deep’. In seeking these models or paradigms, how-
ever, it is clear that the founding fathers individually quite
early settled on a personally preferred paradigm, and tilted
their analysis to support it. For QM, the accumulated effect,
warped by sociological factors, is what has become known as
the “Copenhagen interpretation”.
Some may be inclined to write off these concerns as ‘mere
philosophy’ of little interest “during working hours” to phys-
ical scientists. However, one can observe that, wherever there
is a ‘philosophical’ issue, the mathematics in use is also af-
flicted with one or another pathology. Such a coincidence
makes perfect sense actually; mathematical problems (incon-
sistent or incomplete calculations) nearly always parallel ver-
bal problems (erroneous syntax) insofar as mathematics is just
the use of symbols and formalised algorithms as a sort of
shorthand for ideas originally expressed verbally. Indeed, all
mathematics is taught by means of oral explanations. Philo-
sophical problems, following this logic, are often, therefore,
symptoms of physics problems. Moreover, there may well be
very practical consequences with regard to eventual applica-
tions derived from self consistent interpretations.
II. IRREALITY
Irreal wave functions are of the form:
ψ(r1,r2) = ϕ(r1,r2)+χ(r1,r2), (1)
where ψ(r1,r2) represents a wave function for a combined
system of subsystems, and both ϕ(r1,r2) and χ(r1,r2) are the
wave functions for potential outcomes. Wave functions of this
form are irreal if the summands are logically mutually exclu-
sive, i.e., states that by all logic cannot exist simultaneously.
There is, in addition, a continuous variant of this same struc-
ture, in which, for example a point particle, which can be at
only one location at once, is represented by a wave packet
finite over several locations. All the conceptual features of ir-
reality are evident, nevertheless, in the binary version as cap-
tured in Eq. (1); thus, let us focus on it.
A prototypical example of a binary irreal wave function is
the singlet state used to describe the emission of correlated
photon pairs for an EPR experiment:
ψ(1,2) = 1√
2
(ψ1S(↑)ψ2S(→)−ψ1S(→)ψ2S(↑)) , (2)
where the system’s state is supposed to be the difference of
permutations of polarised photon pairs. Since each pair can
have one or the other orientation-combination at a time, the
2summands are logically mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, ac-
cording to the ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation, this combination
state is considered the ‘real’ ontological state of the system
until measurement ‘collapses’ this wave function to one or
the other ‘non irreal’ summand—as must happen since irreal
states are never actually observed in experiments.
Irreality of wave functions is nowadays of relatively low
concern; an explanation of a possible reason for this should
emerge below. In part, this is due to the fact that in many cases
the summands are not mutually exclusive and the wave func-
tion exhibits simple, and non problematic, ‘superposition.’
A natural question here is: just how did this situation arise;
what reasoning lead to accepting such an extraordinary sup-
position? What problems brought this reasoning about? To
this writer it appears that the answer should be found ex-
actly there, where the first appearance of wave functions of
the form of Eq. (1) arose in the literature. Almost certainly,
it is in HEISENBERG’s initial treatment of the two electron
atom, helium.[1]
His initial efforts to solve this problem were aimed pri-
marily at getting a useful answer for spectroscopy and only
incidentally at developing and promulgating his preferred
paradigm. As a ‘test bed’ for developing the appropriate
formalism, HEISENBERG chose the problem of coupled har-
monic oscillators.[1] This problem is parallel to the problem
of the helium atom in that each electron is primarily influ-
enced by the nucleus and only secondarily by the other elec-
tron, analogously to oscillators whose behaviour is primarily
determined by the ‘spring constant(s)’ and secondarily by a
relatively weak coupling between the oscillators.
HEISENBERG observed, that it is a characteristic feature of
atomic systems, that the components of which they are com-
prised, namely electrons, are identical and subject to identical
forces. Therefore, in order to invest this feature in his ‘test
bed’, he assumed the HAMILTONian to be of the form:
H =
1
2m
p21 +
m
2
ω2q21 +
1
2m
p22 +
m
2
ω2q22 +mκq1q2; (3)
i.e., the frequencies and masses of the coupled oscillators are
taken to be identical. In Eq. (3), q1, q2 denote the coordinates,
p1, p2 the momenta, m and ω the mass and frequency respec-
tively, and κ the interaction constant. With help of the well
known transformations:
q′1 =
1√
2
(q1 + q2), q′2 =
1√
2
(q1− q2), (4)
Eq. (3) is transformed into the separated form:
H =
1
2m
p′21 +
m
2
ω′21 +
1
2m
p′22 +
m
2
ω′22 q
′2
2 , (5)
where
ω′21 = ω
2 +κ, ω′22 = ω
2−κ. (6)
In other words, H separates into the sum of two oscillators,
such that each corresponds to a “normal mode”, in the tech-
nique long before developed by DANIEL BERNOULLI. When
only the first mode, q′1, is excited, then both masses oscillate
in phase, and when only q′2 is excited, out of phase.
The energies according to QM for the combined system are
then give by the equation:
Hn′1,n′2 =
ω′1h
2pi
(
n′1 +
1
2
)
+
w′2h
2pi
(
n′2 +
1
2
)
, (7)
where n′1 and n′2 are integers.
In his scheme, the solutions that HEISENBERG obtained are
matrix elements found using his version of QM. The solutions
from Eq. (7) are, as is usually the case for normal coordinates,
not physically observable, but particular solutions of an ab-
stract combined system. The observables are the inverses of
Eqs. (4). At this stage the solutions do not yet suffer irreality;
indeed, the classical mechanical solutions present no philo-
sophical problems. If the initial conditions are appropriate,
the system executes motion described by one of the normal
modes, otherwise, the solution is a secular oscillation of the
total system energy between the two oscillators.
Observing that, at the atomic scale it is not possible to
determine the exact details of light absorption and emis-
sion, HEISENBERG asserted, not altogether cogently, that
he considered discontinuities more faithful to reality than
SCHRO¨DINGER’s continuous waves.[2] It is reasonably ar-
guable, however, that actually he succumbed to sociological
pressure, as portrayed by FORMAN, namely to conform to
the pervasive antideterministic philosophical proclivities pre-
vailing in German academia following World War I.[3] Thus,
with scant underpinning, seemingly in order to accommodate
the Zeitgeist, he simply chose a paradigm involving intrinsic
randomness. This, HEISENBERG realized by supposing that
the solutions, in place of secular oscillation, exhibit random,
spontaneous, secular-like jumping back and forth.
Instantaneous jumping by itself, is not necessarily irreal;
implicitly there can be a hidden variable that specifies as a
function of time just which electron is excited in the series of
jumps back and forth, that perhaps an extention of QM could
predict. However, admitting this possibility would undermine
the sociological goal of discrediting determinism; and so, for
whatever reason, this possibility was rejected out of hand.
The explicit insinuation of the ‘completion’ assumption
into the paradigm, or the ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation, was
a complicated and turbid development, the history of which
has been analysed extensively by BELLER.[4] Notably, VON
NEUMANN took up the question of completion at the latest by
1932. He proffered a demonstration to the effect that presum-
ing the existence of hidden variables completing QM implied
that some existing quantum structure is objectively false.[5]
Although this seemed to settle the question, it was quickly
seen (but not widely heeded) that his argument contained ir-
relevant hypothetical inputs.[6] In general, both those support-
ing HEISENBERG’s discontinuous and SCHRO¨DINGER’s con-
tinuous paradigms seemed more eager than not to assume that
quantum theory is complete. Presumably, this happened, to
some degree uncritically, as it satisfied the ambition of the
participants to be creating a deep and fundamental new the-
ory; and moreover, it did not clash with the prevailing cultural
3bias.
The strictly logical consequence, the implicit paradox, of
this assumption, however, was not assiduously analysed un-
til later after the renowned paper by EINSTEIN, PODOL-
SKY and ROSEN (EPR).[7] It was only with the controversy
evoked by their arguments that the consequences of ‘com-
pleteness’, became a generally acknowledged issue. For ex-
ample, SCHRO¨DINGER reacted immediately with analysis of
the then current understanding of the meaning of QM in which
he introduced the term “entanglement” for that form of cor-
relation attributed to irreal wave functions.[8] In his paper
on this matter there are no new quantum techniques intro-
duced, just new terminology to facilitate deliberate analysis
of the then just implicit connotations for the terms used dis-
cussing interpretations. This work, being overtly critical, was
no doubt a contribution to the duel with HEISENBERG on
the relative merits of discontinuous (matrix) versus continu-
ous wave paradigms. In it SCHRO¨DINGER embellished EPR’s
illustrative gedanken experiment to the now renowned and ab-
surdly irreal live-dead “cat paradox”.
The crucial point here is, if QM is complete, then there can
be no hidden variables to specify which excited state among
the constituents at any moment is ontologically valid, thereby
giving their sum this role. That is, then all components, even
mutually exclusive options, are to be extant simultaneously,
even when not verifiable by observation. In short, if QM is
complete, then there must be irreal states!
III. NONLOCALITY
Nonlocality was introduced as the cure for irreality. The
fact that observations never (could!) reveal states that are
comprised of irreal sums of mutually exclusive options, im-
plies, it was hypothesised, that measurement itself some-
how “collapses” the ontological wave function to the ‘post-
measurement wave function’, that is, just one of the options
comprising the irreal, ‘pre-measurement’ wave function.1 In-
sofar as measurement of one of a correlated pair instanta-
neously collapses a wave function for the other, regardless of
its separation, the process insinuates ‘nonlocality’.
JOHN BELL in the 1950’s, having rediscovered VON NEU-
MANN’s misstep and with inspiration from BOHMian mechan-
ics, took up the issue with the goal of bringing it to an exper-
imental nexus.[9] He did this with analysis subsequently, and
strictly incorrectly, labelled a “theorem”, to the effect that lo-
cality demands that a certain statistic (Eq. (17) below) be less
than |2|. Experiments show, however, that it can reach |2√2|;
and, nowadays the difference is taken to characterise “stronger
than classical” correlations which have become denoted “en-
tanglements”. In recent times this matter has taken on, so to
1 Although many early papers read as if their authors imagined wave ‘col-
lapse’ upon measurement, VON NEUMANN appears to have been the first
to have made the matter explicit.[5] The issue is confounded by the fact,
that measurement is to collapse simple superpositions also.
speak, a life of its own, that is, irreality has slid into oblivion
and usually not discussed as the raison d’eˆtre for nonlocality
In any case, BELL’s final conclusion was that, because
QM is ineluctably nonlocal, any insinuation of hidden vari-
ables to ‘complete’ it, cannot lead to a deeper formulation
that is ‘local’ and ‘real’. In turn, however, BELL’s argu-
ment too has come under criticism, starting with EDWIN
JAYNES,[10], who parsed BELL’s encoding of locality and
found that it overlooked structure requiring BAYES’ formula
for conditional probabilities. This writer has taken up this
line and extended it by working out explicit consequences of
JAYNES’ point for the experiments thought to verify BELL’s
analysis.[11; 12] That is, classical, local, realist models for
all the generic forms of EPR-type experiments have been
developed which lead to calculations, based essentially on
MALUS’ Law, utterly devoid of irreality and nonlocality,
yielding curves precisely mimicking data taken in EPR ex-
periments, |2√2| and all. Since BELL’s theorem states in ef-
fect that such models do not exist, exhibiting them shows that
BELL’s theorem is wrong or misunderstood.
JAYNES’ essential point is that whereas BELL wrote the
joint probability P(a,b) for a coincidence event in an EPR
experiment, where the measurement settings are a and b, and
λ represents the imputed “hidden variables”, in the form:
P(a,b) =
∫
dλρ(λ)P(a,λ)P(b,λ), (8)
he should have written:
p(a,b) =
∫
dλρ(λ)P(a|b,λ)P(b|λ), (9)
where the latter form employs what is known as BAYES’ for-
mula or simply as the definition of conditional (versus abso-
lute) probability.[14] Eq. (9), it can be easily verified, does
not admit deriving any form of the renowned “BELL inequal-
ities”. What this means is that BELL misencoded ‘locality’
as ‘statistical independence’, so that the observed violation
of such inequalities in experiments cannot be interpreted to
mean that nonlocal interaction or nonlocal correlation is in ev-
idence. Rather, only, that the inequalities pertain when there
is no correlations of any type, nonlocal or otherwise, contrary
to EPR’s, and subsequently to BELL’s, hypothesis and the
explicit design of experiments involving correlated pairs of
inputs.
Since this matter has been explicated in detail elsewhere,
[11; 12; 13], here only one variant of several counter argu-
ments shall be featured. Its key idea is that if the physical
meaning of the terms in BELL’s extraction of his inequalities
are carefully interpreted, it is seen that certain of them must
be zero, thereby leading to a form of these inequalities for
which there is no significance with regard to his sought after
conclusion. This counter argument, which is independent of
JAYNES’ criticism, but based on the same structure, proceeds
as follows:
First, recall a mathematical technicality concerning the
product of two Dirac delta functions, which is essential for
what follows. It is that the integral of the product of two delta
functions for which the arguments are different, equals zero;
4i.e.:
∫
dx f (x)δ(x− l)δ(x−m) = 0, (10)
whenever l 6= m.
The derivation of a Bell Inequality starts from BELL’s fun-
damental assertion:
P(a, b) =
∫
dλρ(λ)A(a, λ)B(b, λ), (11)
where, per explicit assumption: A is not a function of b; nor
B of a; and each represents the appearance of a photoelectron
in its wing of an EPR experiment, and a and b are the cor-
responding polariser filter settings.2 This is motivated on the
grounds that a measurement at station A, if it respects ‘local-
ity’, so argues BELL, cannot depend instantaneously on re-
mote conditions, such as the settings of the other polariser. In
addition, each, by definition, satisfies
|A| ≤ 1, |B| ≤ 1, (12)
which in this case effectively restricts the analysis to the case
of just one photoelectron per time window per detector. Eq.
(11) encodes the condition, that when the hidden variables are
averaged out, the usual results from QM are to be recovered.
The λ above in BELL’s analysis stands for a hypothetical
set of “hidden variables”, which, if they exist, should render
QM deterministic. This set may include many different types
of variables, such as discrete, continuous, tensor or whatever.
Extraction of inequalities proceeds by considering differences of two such correlations where (a, b), i.e., the polariser axis of
measuring stations, left and right, differ:
P(a, b)−P(a, b′) = ∫ dλρ(λ)[A(a, λ)B(b, λ)−A(a, λ)B(b′, λ)], (13)
to which zero in the form:
A(a, λ)B(b, λ)A(a′, λ)B(b′, λ)−A(a, λ)B(b′, λ)A(a′, λ)B(b, λ) = 0, (14)
is added to get:
P(a, b)−P(a, b′) =
∫
dλρ(λ)A(a, λ)B(b, λ)[1±A(a′, λ)B(b′, λ)]−
∫
dλρ(λ)A(a, λ)B(b′, λ)[1±A(a′, λ)B(b, λ)], (15)
which, in turn, upon taking absolute values and in view of Eqs. (12), BELL wrote as:
|P(a, b)−P(a, b′)| ≤ ∫ dλρ(λ)[1±A(a′, λ)B(b′, λ)]+ ∫ dλρ(λ)[1±A(a′, λ)B(b, λ)]. (16)
Then, using Eq. (11), and the normalisation condition ∫ dλρ(λ) = 1, he got, for example:
|P(a, b)−P(a, b′)|+ |P(a′, b′)+P(a′, b)| ≤ 2, (17)
a ‘Bell inequality’.
Now, however, if the λ are a complete set 2,3, thereby
rendering everything deterministic so that all probabilities as
functions of λ become Dirac or Kronecker delta distributions,
then the A’s and B’s in Eq. (15) are pair-wise; that is to say
as individual events comprising the generation at the source of
one pair, are non zero for distinct values of λ, which, by virtue
of completeness, do not coincide for distinct events, i.e., for
2 BELL’s notation, e.g., P(a,λ), makes no distinction between variables, here
a, and conditioning parameters, here λ, customarily separated by a vertical
bar rather than a comma. This oversight is the source of much confusion,
and possibly even the subliminal cause of his ‘error’. In this paper, Bell’s
notation is retained whenever referring directly to his formulas.
3 BELL used a single symbol: λ, to denote what could be a complicated set
of variables of possibly different types even. Thus, a “particular values for
λ” means that each entity in the whole set must have a value.
different pairs. That is, for each pair of settings (a = r, b = s)
and iteration of the experiment, n, there exists a unique set
of values, λa=r,b=s(n = integer), or in more compact nota-
tion, λ(n), say, for which A(a|λ(n))B(b|λ(n)) is non-zero (1
in the discrete case, ∞ in the continuous case). In other words,
each product A(a|λ(n))B(b|λ(n)) can be written in the form
f (x)δ(x−λ(n)), so that all quadruple products, e.g.,
A(a|λ(n))B(b|λ(n))A(a|λ(m))B(b|λ(m)), (18)
are equivalent to the form:
f (x)δ(x−λ(n))g(x)δ(x−λ(m)), (19)
where x is a dummy variable of integration to run over all ad-
missible values of λ. Therefore, such terms with pair-wise
different values of λ(n) in Eq. (15), i.e., whenever n 6= m ,
are, in accord with Eq. (10), identically zero under integra-
tion over λ. This annihilates two terms on the right side of
5Eq. (15), so that the final form of this Bell Inequality is then
actually the trivial identity:
|P(a, b)|+ |P(a′, b′)| ≤ 2. (20)
Thus, our final conclusion is, that the proof of the in-
eluctability of the presence of nonlocality in QM, is invalid.
In the context of what is actually a further point regarding the
admissibility of additional, ostensibly still ‘hidden’ variable
completions of QM, this conclusion undermines the popular
impression that such a ‘completion’ necessarily cannot rein-
state ‘reality’ and ‘locality.’4
IV. BOHM’S VERSION OF EPR EXPERIMENTS
EPR proposed a gedanken experiment involving the disin-
tegration of a mother particle into two daughters moving off in
opposite directions.[7] They observed that quantum principles
state that HAMILTONian conjugate variables suffer HEISEN-
BERG uncertainty, and therefore, cannot be simultaneously
determined exactly. But, in the situation envisioned by EPR,
the experimenter could observe one daughter’s position to ar-
bitrarily high precision, while observing to arbitrarily high
precision the other daughter’s momentum; and, then, calling
on symmetry, one could specify to arbitrary high precision
all four quantities—in conflict with HEISENBERG’s Principle.
Hence, the paradox.
Complicating matters, actually doing the EPR experiment
as proposed, is impractical. So, as is well known, BOHM
proposed another venue, now called “qubit” space.[16] Orig-
inally he considered using particles with spin; but, this venue
too was impractical, so experimenters chose spin’s homeo-
morphic partner: light polarisation space. This change of
venue, however, introduces two serious defects. One, the two
states of polarisation, in spite of not commuting (for purely
geometric reasons it turns out), are not HAMILTONian con-
jugate pairs; the structure involved in not intrinsic to QM,
but just to classical electrodynamics. Two, the two polarisa-
tion states are non interacting; the structure leading to ‘irreal’
states as the sum of two mutually contradictory summands, is
not relevant. Appropriate states for emissions of polarisation
correlated daughter signals can be expressed without use of
the ‘irreal’ format. In conclusion, even disregarding JAYNES’
challenge to their general validity, various hypothetical inputs
into the logic of the derivation of BELL inequalities have not
been met by optical experiments widely credited with “prov-
ing BELL’s theorem”.5
4 KOCHEN-SPECKER type ‘no-go’ theorems without probabilities also can
be shown to be defective as all their hypothetical inputs cannot be true
simultaneously on physical grounds.[15]
5 EPR experiments on particles have given largely ambiguous results for ad-
ditional, independent reasons. See: [17] for a current review of EPR exper-
iments, albeit without acknowledging JAYNES’ arguments.
V. SUMMARY AND FORECAST
Herein, history has been, so to say, “rewritten” so as to
parse better the logical interrelationships among the features
constraining development of an interpretation for QM. The
concluding point here is that the assumption that quantum
theory is “complete” compelled the introduction of the no-
tions of ‘irreality’ and ‘nonlocality’. That the assumption
of ‘completeness’ is the source of conflicted logic is by far
not here unique; POST has argued convincingly already for
decades, on the basis of detailed analysis of numerous spe-
cific “quantum” phenomena, that this assumption introduces
serious lacuna.[18]
Unfortunately, simply rejecting the completeness assump-
tion alone does not render the matter clear. QM captures
an undulatory feature even deeper than the structure in-
volving the statistics of ensembles of atomic scale entities;
this requires a physical nature for ‘wave functions’; despite
SCHRO¨DINGER’s failure to find it, they cannot simply be just
progenitors of statistical densities. A full remedy must be
found elsewhere.6
Independently and additionally, I argue in support of
JAYNES, that BELL’s analysis stemming from the EPR argu-
ments in favour of the incompleteness of QM, contains an er-
ror.
Beyond the philosophical (or accompanying mathematical)
implications of revamping the nowadays customary under-
standing of this issue in terms of “entanglement”, there is a
possible solidly practical consequence. It follows from the
fact that the physical manifestations of entanglement targeted
for exploitation, all depend in the end on the consequences
of superposition resulting from the linearity of the hyperbolic
differential equation underpinning QM, i.e., SCHRO¨DINGER’s
equation. Since this hyperbolic structure is not an exclusive
consequence of any quantum feature, certain applications now
thought to require atomic scale realization, ‘quantum logic
gates’ for example, may in fact not need micro devices to run
what are thought to be ‘quantum algorithms’. As manufactur-
ing macroscopic devices is much easier, a computer realizing
the parallelism of what turns out to be implicit in all FOURIER
analysis, not just from ‘quantum entanglement’, might be em-
inently obtainable.7
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